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Bok−Min Goi is with the Faculty of Engineering, Multimedia University, MALAYSIA (e-mail: bmgoi@mmu.edu.my). During the Registration phase, the new user, U i presents his ID to the authentication server, AS, who then generates the user's password, PW i by simply hashing the concatenation of the user's ID and AS's long-term secret key, x. This password is then sent back to U i through a secure channel. Further, AS also stores details of the hash function, h in the smart card, SC i . Now when the user logs in to the system during the Login phase, he inputs his ID and password, PW i to this smart card which then interacts with the AS by forwarding the user's ID, the current timestamp, T and a computed value, C 1 that is the result of hashing the exclusive-OR (XOR) of T and PW i .
With this, the protocol enters the Authentication phase where the AS checks the validity of the ID i and the freshness of T, failure of which would result in the login request being rejected. Otherwise, the AS recomputes the password, PW i and subsequently recomputes C 1 to check with the C 1 value received from the smart card. If they match, then the user is successfully authenticated.
B. Chien et. al's Scheme
The scheme due to Chien et. al similarly comprise the three above phases except that the user is allowed to choose his own password and hence gives more user convenience. In more detail:
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During the Registration phase, the new user, U i presents his ID as well as a chosen password, PW i to the authentication server, AS, who then computes a value R i which is dependent on the user's ID, AS' secret key, x and the user's password. This is stored in the user's smartcard along with details of the used hash function, h. During the Login phase, the user inputs his ID and password, PW i to his smart card which then interacts with the AS by forwarding the user's ID, the current timestamp, T and a computed value, C 1 that is the result of hashing the exclusive-OR of R i , T and PW i .
The protocol now enters the Authentication phase where the AS checks the validity of the ID i and the freshness of T, failure of which would result in the login request being rejected. Otherwise, the AS recomputes the value C 1 and checks it with the C 1 received from the smart card. If they match, then the user is successfully authenticated.
Further, the AS computes another value, C 2 which is dependent on the user's ID, AS's secret key, x and the latest timestamp, T'' at that point. This C 2 is then sent back to the user who then recomputes C 2 and checks for a match in order to authenticate AS. Therefore, Chien et. al's protocol allows for mutual authentication of both parties.
III. FLAWS IN HSU'S ATTACKS ON SUN'S SCHEME
In this section, we point out flaws in Hsu's two password guessing attacks on Sun's scheme. In particular, Hsu's off-line password guessing attack is an obvious and trivial fact, and hence does not constitute an attack at all, while his on-line password guessing attack on Sun's scheme is heavily flawed.
A. Hsu's Off-line Password Guessing Attack
Hsu's off-line guessing attack requires that the attacker eavesdrop during the login phase in order to obtain the value of T and C 1 . He then needs to guess all possible values of the password, PW i , and then verify if h(T ⊕ PW i ) equals C 1 .
Guessing all possible values of the password, and for each guess, checking if it is true is merely an exhaustive search of the password space and is an obvious fact and well-known weakness of any cryptographic scheme! Claiming it to be an attack is analogous to claiming to have re-invented the wheel. It is therefore not considered an attack at all.
B. Hsu's On-line Password Guessing Attack
Hsu's on-line guessing attack also requires that an attacker guesses all possible values of the password, PW i , computing the value of C 1 * = h(T ⊕ PW i ) and replacing the original C 1 in the login phase with C 1 *. This is then submitted to AS, and the attacker keeps repeating this until AS finally accepts it as valid.
Besides having the same flaw as the previous off-line attack in that it is merely a trivial exhaustive search of the password space, this attack also has stronger requirements since an attacker must perform an active attack, in contrast to the previous which merely required eavesdropping and hence is a passive attack. Furthermore, exhaustively guessing a password has only a very small probability of 2 −k (where k is the size of the password in bits) of being accepted by AS. After only a few unsuccessful guessing attempts, AS would have noticed something amiss and blacklisted the attacker! In summary, both Hsu's attacks should be disregarded as they are heavily flawed.
IV. IMPROVED ATTACKS ON SUN'S AND CHIEN ET. AL'S SCHEMES
In this section, we present practical attacks on both Sun's and Chien et. al's schemes. Our attacks are more practical in the sense that they require only simple eavesdropping and hence are passive attacks, in contrast to active attacks that require an attacker to interfere with the communicated messages, for example Hsu's parallel session attack [3] on Chien et. al's scheme.
For this purpose, we recall the three phases of Chien et. al's scheme, as described in subsection II.B. Hsu's attack requires that the attacker eavesdrop on the communication during the login phase, in particular during the message sent from the user's smart card to AS, in order to obtain the values of T and C 1 . He then masquerades as the user, U i and generates a new login request message to AS by making use of the eavesdropped values. This is an active attack since an attacker needs to introduce new messages into the communication.
We now describe our attack which is a passive attack. The attacker similarly eavesdrops during the login phase, but the difference is that he does so during the message sent from the user, U i to the smart card and hence obtains PW i . With the knowledge of this, he can then freely masquerade as U i in any future login. Since our attack only requires an attacker to eavesdrop and not to interfere with any communicated messages, it is more practical and an attacker can remain undetected.
Similarly, our attack also applies to Sun's scheme where the attacker merely eavesdrops during the login phase during the message sent from U i to his smart card, and the rest follows as in our attack on Chien et. al's scheme.
V. FURTHER REMARKS ON SECURITY

A. Remarks on Chien et. al's Scheme
First, we remark that Hsu's attack on Chien et. al's scheme appears to be sound, and works because parts of different messages (in this case C 1 and C 2 ) have the same structure − both being equal to h( h(ID i ⊕ x) ⊕ timestamp ) − which allows an attacker to reuse a part of a previous message as a valid part in a new message. This is a very well-known weakness [4] of authentication schemes that allows for replay attacks and should be avoided entirely.
Also, this scheme is very insecure since both the user's identity, ID i and password, PW i are transmitted in the clear both during the registration and the login phases. This not only allows an attacker to eavesdrop and obtain these values, but also allows him to modify them according to his liking and lead to masquerades and denial of service attacks.
B. Remarks on Both Schemes
Both schemes use C 1 = h(T ⊕ z) for authentication, where z is PW i for Sun's scheme, while it is R i ⊕ PW i for Chien et. al's scheme. Regardless, we observe that both schemes use the timestamp, T within the hash function, h and so T is not really tied to a unique C 1 since different T values with different z values could still result in the same T ⊕ z that is input to h and so produce the same C 1 . T therefore has lost its main objective as a "time stamp" since this shows that there is no way to bind a certain C 1 to a unique T to prove that it was generated only at that time.
For ease of discussion we suppose that the input, T ⊕ z to h is simply 3 bits in length. Then, defining z = z 2 z 1 z 0 and T = T 2 T 1 T 0 , we would have the situation as in Table 1 .
TABLE I DIFFERENTIAL INPUTS TO HASH FUNCTION
